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Young: Stigma Damages: Defining the Appropriate Balance Between Full Com

STIGMA DAMAGES: DEFINING THE
APPROPRIATE BALANCE BETWEEN FULL
COMPENSATION AND REASONABLE CERTAINTY
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider the following scenario: You own property situated near a gas
station. Some of the gas station's underground storage tanks leak, dispersing
gasoline on and around your property. The gas station owner begins
remediation efforts, and eventually all of the gasoline is removed from your
property. However, despite full remediation, you and your neighbors have
experienced a diminution in property value. Buyers are afraid to purchase your
formerly contaminated property, and this fear has reduced the value of your
property. Your property has been stigmatized.
Inthe past fifteen years, plaintiffs have increasingly sought to recover
damages for the diminution in their property value caused by stigma.' While
the vast majority of stigma damage claims arise from contamination cases
based on common law trespass or nuisance theories, courts
have addressed the3
2
issue of stigma damages in cases regarding CERCLA, defective construction,
termite damage,4 and deceptive trade practices.' The variety of claims, along

1. See Alex Geisinger, Nothing but FearItsef." A Social-PsychologicalModel ofStigma
Harm and Its Legal Implications, 76 NEB. L. REv. 452,457 (1997).'
2. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9675 (1994); see Scribner v. Summers, 138 F.3d 471, 473 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting
uncertainty of New York law on stigma damage and expressing desire to certify question to state
court); In rePaoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 798 (3d Cir. 1994) (formulating three-part
test for recovery of stigma damages); Berry v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 989 F.2d 822, 829 (5th
Cir. 1993) (denying recovery of stigma damages in the absence of physical harm to the
property); Rhodes v. County ofDarlington, 833 F. Supp. 1163,1180 (D.S.C. 1992) (holding that
property damage is not a "response cost" under CERCLA).
3. See Aas v. Superior Court, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 581, 604-05 (Ct. App. 1998) (holding
petitioner's claim for stigma damages generic and speculative where petitioner offered evidence
that homes with construction defects generally suffer a 2.8% decrease in value); McAlonan v.
United States Home Corp., 724 P.2d 78,79 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986) (affirming lower court's jury
instruction to award damages for "the reasonable cost of repairing the property, together with
the decrease in market value, if any,.. . as repaired"); Pelletier v. Pelletier Dev. Co., No. CV
940463671S, 1996 WL 166675, at*5 (Conn. Super. CL Mar. 14, 1996) ("[T]he proper measure
of damages is cost of repair plus the 'stigma' factor."); Anderson v. Bauer, 681 P.2d 1316,1324
(Wyo. 1984) (awarding damages for diminution in value caused by public awareness of water
damage of the property).
4. See Horsch v. Terminix Int'l Co., 865 P.2d 1044,1049 (Kan. Ct. App. 1993) (affirming
lower court's award of damages for diminution in property value based on stigma of termite
damage); Tudor Chateau Creole Apts. P'ship v. D.A. Exterminating Co., 691 So. 2d 1259, 1265
(La. Ct. App. 1997) (affirming trial court's award of damages for both cost of repairs and
diminution in value and acknowledging that "the total structural damage to the property is
unknown" and "must, by law, be passed on to any purchaser"); Terminix Int'l, Inc. v. Lucci, 670
S.W.2d 657, 663-64 (Tex. Ct.App. 1984) (affirming lower court's award of damages for cost
of repair and diminution in value based on evidence proving "the difficulty of ascertaining the
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with the often uncertain nature of stigma damage, has led to diverse and often
confusingjurisprudence. Struggling with the desire to make the plaintiffwhole 6
while awarding only those damages that are proven with reasonable certainty,7
different jurisdictions have fashioned a variety of rules on which to base the
award of stigma damages. While most jurisdictions agree that plaintiffs must
experience some physical injury to their property before they may recover
stigma damages,' jurisdictions are divided on whether the injury must be
temporary or permanent. South Carolina only recently addressed the issue of
permanency in Yadkin Brick Co. v. MaterialsRecovery Co.9
Critics argue that stigma damages should not be awarded because they are
based on public perceptions, which can change at any time.10 However,
stigmatized property suffers a diminution in value for which the owner should
be compensated. The ideal rule for stigma damages must address both of these
concerns. This Comment explores the courts' treatment of stigma damages in
different jurisdictions, paying particular attention to the conflicting goals of

extent ofthe termite damage, the tendency oftermites to revive and return to their scene of harm
and the general bad reputation of termites to survive and eat more").
5. See Pelletier, 1996 WL 166675, at *7 (rejecting deceptive trade practices claim but
awarding cost of repair plus "'stigma' factor" for breach of construction contract); Smith v.
Levine, 911 S.W.2d 427, 434 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995) (affirming the lower court's award of
damages for the stigma attached to a defective foundation in a claim based on the Texas
Deceptive Trade Practices Act).
6. See RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFTORTS § 901 cmt. a (1979) ("[T]he law of torts attempts
primarily to put an injured person in a position as nearly as possible equivalent to his position
prior to the tort.").
7. See id. § 912 (providing that an injured party is entitled to damages only if "he
establishes by proof the extent of the harm and the amount of money representing adequate
compensation with as much certainty as the nature of the tort and the circumstances permit").
The SecondRestatementfurther states that "[i]tis desirable... that there be definiteness ofproof
of the amount of damage as far as is reasonably possible." Id. at cmt. a.
8. But see In re Tutu Wells Contamination Litig., 909 F. Supp. 991,996-97 (D.V.I. 1995)
(holding that Virgin Islands law does not require physical harm to real property in order to
recover damages based on nuisance); Acadian Heritage Realty, Inc. v. City of Lafayette, 446 So.
2d 375,379 (La. Ct. App. 1984) (allowing stigma damage recovery for the mere existence of a
landfill operated adjacent to property plaintiffs intended to develop as a subdivision).
9. 339 S.C. 640, 647-48, 529 S.E.2d 764, 768 (Ct. App. 2000).
10. See E. Jean Johnson, Environmental Stigma Damages: Speculative Damages in
EnvironmentalTort Cases, 15 UCLA J. ENmrL. L. & POL'Y 185, 193-95 (1997) (noting that "a
defendant's liability for stigma damages depends solely upon what the public perceives, no
matter how inaccurate or unreasonable the perceptions" and attributing public misperception to
media coverage and lack of education on environmental matters); see also Anthony Vale &
Joanna Cline, Stigma and PropertyContamination-DamnumAbsque Injuria,33 ToRT & INS.
L.J. 835, 836 (1998) (listing multiple factors that affect the value of stigmatized property such
as "the level of fear generated among the public; the prognosis for the site; public perception of
the person or entity responsible for [the damage]; the visibility of the problem; and the actual
degree of danger ...implicated by significant contract with a particular parcel"); Eric S.
Schlichter, Comment, Stigma Damages in Environmental Contamination Cases: A Possible
WindfallforPlaintiffs?,34HOUS.L.REV. 1125,1152 (1997) ("The impact of stigma on property
values changes 'over time as publicity levels and information flows' shape the public perception
of the problem." (citation omitted)).
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fully compensating the plaintiff for her injury while only awarding those
damages that can be proven with reasonable certainty. Part 11 examines the two
dominant trends the courts have followed in awarding stigma damages. Part III
examines the limited treatment of stigma damages in South Carolina. Part IV
recommends a rule that South Carolina courts should follow as the growth in
stigma damage claims necessitates a more refined holding to manage the
opposing goals of full compensation and reasonable certainty.
II. DEFINING THE BOUNDARIES FOR RECOVERY

A. Santa Fe Partnership: No Recovery in the Absence of Permanent
Damage

Several jurisdictions have addressed the issues of certainty and causation
by requiringproofofpermanent physical injury before a landowner can recover
stigma damages." These jurisdictions have held fast to the traditional damage
rule allowing recovery for diminution in value for permanent injury to property

and repair costs for temporary injury to property. Unfortunately, stigma
damage is difficult to categorize as permanent or temporary. Often, the physical
injury to the property is temporary, but the stigma remains even after full
remediation. In such a situation, the traditional rule is inflexible and

undercompensating.
The California Court of Appeals faced this situation in Santa Fe

Partnershipv. ARCO ProductsCo.12 In this case, the property owner, Santa Fe
Partnership, appealed the lower court's judgment in favor of ARCO, an oil

11. See Bradley v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 130 F.3d 168, 176 (5th Cir. 1997) ("The
requirements ofpermanent and physical injury to property ensure that this remedy does not open
the floodgates of litigation by every property owner who believes that a neighbor's use will
injure his property."); Bartleson v.United States, 96 F.3d 1270,1275 (9th Cir. 1996) ("Damages
for diminution in property value due to stigma have been recognized by the California courts in
cases ofpermanent nuisance."); Mehlenbacherv. Akzo Nobel Salt, Inc., 71 F. Supp. 2d 179,188
(W.D.N.Y. 1999) ("In order to recover damages for diminution in value.... property owners
must show... that their property has been physically damaged, or that their use and enjoyment
of their property has been unreasonably interfered with... and ...either that the trespass or
nuisance thus created cannot be fully remediated, or that the cost ofremediation would exceed
the amountby which the value of the property has been diminished."); Ruddv. Electrolux Corp.,
982 F. Supp. 355,372 (M.D.N.C. 1997) (holding that "stigma damages are not permitted unless
the nuisance is classified as permanent.. ."); Santa Fe P'ship v. ARCO Prods. Co., 54 Cal. Rptr.
2d 214,214 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (denying recovery for diminution in value based on theory of
continuingnuisance); Stevinson v.Deffenbaugh Indus., Inc., 870 S.W.2d 851,856 (Mo. Ct. App.
1993) (holding that landowner's action for temporary nuisance barred claim for stigma damages,
which are available only in an action for permanent nuisance); Yadkin Brick Co. v. Materials
Recovery Co., 339 S.C. 640, 647, 529 S.E.2d 764, 768 (Ct. App. 2000) (affirming a directed
verdict denying stigma damages because of a failure to show permanent injury to the property).
12. 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 214, 217 (CL App. 1996), review denied, 1996 Cal. LEXIS 5727, at
*1 (Cal. Oct. 2, 1996).
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company. 3 ARCO's underground storage tanks, located adjacent to Santa Fe
Partnership's property, leaked gasoline into the soil and groundwater. 4 Testing
showed that the leak contaminated Santa Fe Partnership's property.'s Santa Fe
Partnership contracted to sell the contaminated property, but the buyer, upon
learning of the contamination, rescinded the contract.' 6 Santa Fe Partnership
brought suit against ARCO based on theories of continuing trespass and
continuing nuisance. 7 "Rather than proceed to trial, the parties stipulated to
entry ofjudgment in ARCO's favor in order to immediately seek review in [the
appellate] court to request an extension of the law which would entitle [Santa
Fe Partnership] to recover damages for diminution in value on a theory of
S
continuing trespass or nuisance."'
In reviewing the case, the appellate court followed the rule expounded by
the California Supreme Court holding that "a plaintiff-landowner cannot
recover damages for... diminution in value, in a case where the nuisance is
deemed to be continuing and abatable."' 9 The court relied on the California
Supreme Court's holding in Spauldingv. Cameron20 that a plaintiff could not
recover for depreciation in value for an abatable nuisance, because the
"[p]laintiff would obtain a double recovery if she could recover for the
depreciation in value and also have the cause of that depreciation removed."'"
The court acknowledged Santa Fe Partnership's argument that while their
injury was not permanent, its effects would be realized for a long time.21
Furthermore, the court agreed that the current state of the law did not
adequately address Santa Fe Partnership's condition:
Appellants acknowledge the current state of California
law. However they claim the concept [that] property reverts
to its pre-contamination value once the contamination is
remediated does not conform to market realities. They claim
remediation may take as long as 20 years, or more in some
cases. In these situations it is difficult, if not impossible, to
sell or secure a loan against the land due to the stigma which
attaches to previously contaminatedproperty. They argue this
prevents a land speculator or investor from realizing his or

13. Id.
14. Id. at 214.
15. Id. at 216.
16. Id.
17. Id. Santa Fe Partnership's claims for permanent nuisance and permanent trespass were
barred by the statute of limitations. Id. at 224. The statute of limitations also barred Santa Fe
Partnership's claims for negligence and strict liability. Id. at 216.
18. SantaFe P'ship,54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 217.
19. Id. at218.
20. 239 P.2d 625 (Cal. 1952).
21. Id. at 629.
22. SantaFe P ship, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 220.
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her profit, and, because investment moneys are locked up in
the contaminated property, prevents such persons from using
that investment money for other projects. Appellants
therefore request this court to "overrule" existing law and
allow "stigma" damages as a proper remedy for a continuing
nuisance caused by chemical pollution of the land.
We acknowledge the logic and general appeal of this
argument.... However, this court does not write on a clean
slate.... [W]e are bound to follow and apply the decisions
of our highest court, which expressly disallow prospective
damages in cases of continuing nuisance.'
In the case of an abatable nuisance, the injured party is expected to "bring
successive actions for damages until the nuisance has been abated." The
California Court of Appeals noted that "[ilt is cumbersome, inefficient and
contrary to the goal of efficient legal remedies to bring numerous and
successive suits during the period [of contamination]." 5 In denying Santa Fe
Partnership's claim for stigma damages, the court admitted that its decision
"may appear to be a harsh result."' However, the court noted that it was bound
by the precedent set by the California Supreme Court.27 The California
Supreme Court denied review.2"
Had Santa Fe Partnership been able to bring claims for permanent nuisance
and permanent trespass, the court most likely would have awarded damages for
diminution in value, and the stigma would have been factored in when
calculating the amount of damages.2 9 While California's decision not to award
stigma damages absent permanent physical injury is rigid, the California courts
do allow injured landowners some flexibility by allowing them to opt for a
permanent nuisance action in the instance that the nuisance, while abatable,
will last for an indefinite period. 0 This option was unavailable to Santa Fe
Partnership because of the statute of limitations.'

23. Id. (footnote omitted).
24. Id. at 219 (quoting Phillips v. City of Pasadena, 162 P.2d 625, 626-27 (Cal. 1945)).
25. Id. at 223.
26. Id. at 224.
27. Id.
28. Santa Fe P'ship v. ARCO Nods. Co., 1996 Cal. LEXIS 5727, at *1 (Cal. Oct. 2, 1996).
29. See Bartleson v. United States, 96 F.3d 1270, 1276 (9th Cir. 1996) (allowing
landowners to opt for a permanent nuisance action where a continuing possibility existed that
shells from adjacent military base would land on landowner's property).
30. See Spaulding v. Cameron, 239 P.2d 625, 627-28 (Cal. 1952). The Spauldingcourt
noted that in some situations, such as with a public utility, the nuisance or trespass is necessary
and indefinite. "Accordingly, it was recognized that some types of nuisances should be
considered permanent, and in such cases recovery of past and anticipated future damages were
[sic] allowed in one action." Id. at 627.
31. Santa Fe P'ship,54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 224.
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Several jurisdictions follow California's rule.32 However, Pennsylvania
applies a much more flexible rule, allowing the landowner to recover stigma
damages for temporary33physical injury to property when there is an ongoing
threat of future injury.
B. Paoli: Stigma DamageRecoveryfor TemporaryPhysicalInjury and
Ongoing Threat ofFutureInjury
In re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB Litigation' involved suits brought by
thirty-eight persons' living adjacent to the Paoli Railyard, "a railcar
maintenance facility at which polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) were used in
profusion for over a quarter century."3' PCBs gradually accumulated in the
railyard soil and eventually leaked into the groundwater and soil of nearby
residences.37 The plaintiffs in the case were those identified by the
Environmental Protection Agency as having experienced the most severe
contamination." "Many of the plaintiffs played in the soil at their homes while
growing up, gardened in it, and ate vegetables grown from it. Many also
regularly traversed the Yard on foot as a short cut to their destinations. 3 9 The
plaintiffs sought recovery for their physical injuries allegedly caused by
exposure to PCBs. 4° Additionally,
[s]ome plaintiffs... brought claims for emotional distress
caused by fear of future injury, and for medical monitoring to
decrease the likelihood of the future development of serious
diseases. Finally, some of the plaintiffs... brought claims for
the decrease in value to their property caused by the presence
of PCBs on the land.4
Because of the complexity ofthe Paolilitigation, this Comment will focus only
on the plaintiffs' claims for property damage caused by the presence of PCBs
on their property.
In the Paolilitigation, the plaintiffs' claims for stigma damages were first
addressed by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of

32. See supra note 11.
33. See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 798 (3d Cir. 1994) (formulating
three-part test for recovery of stigma damages).
34. 35 F.3d 717 (3d Cir. 1994).
35. Id. at 735.
36. Id. at 732.
37. Id. at 734.
38. Id. at 735.
39. Id.
40. In re PaoliR.R. Yard, 35 F.3d at 735.
41. Id.
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Pennsylvania, which granted summary judgment for the defendants.' The court
abided by the traditional rule, holding that "[u]nder Pennsylvania law, the cost
ofremediating harm to property is the exclusive measure ofdamages where the
harm is temporary and remediable."'43 The court noted that damages for
decreased market value are available only when the injury to the property is
permanent." Furthermore, the court noted that under Pennsylvania law, "[t]here
is a presumption . . . that harm to property is temporary and
remediable.... Permanent damage has been found by the Pennsylvania courts
in only the most extraordinary situations.""'
Relying on Wade v. S.J. Groves & Sons Co.,4 the plaintiffs argued that the
threat of future harm should be considered a "permanent harm" that would
allow recovery for the diminution in market value oftheir property.4 7 While not
rejecting Wade, the district court held that the plaintiffs "presented no evidence
outside the pleadings that any harm has ever been caused to [p]laintiffs'
properties from the alleged groundwater contamination or that it poses a future
threat of harm." The court rejected the plaintiffs' evidence of stigma damage,
holding that "[p]laintiffs have failed to cite any authority which determines that
decreases in property values due to mere proximity to a site containing
perceived hazardous chemicals is compensable in Pennsylvania." The district
court granted summary judgment for the defendants."0
The landowners appealed, and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
the lower court's ruling." In its decision, the court of appeals departed from the
traditional rule awarding damages only in the face of permanent injury, noting
that the "appropriate measure of damages is generally defined as what is
necessary to compensate fully the plaintiff."' 2
The court noted that the evidence indicated that even after remediation, a
human health hazard would still remain.53 Thus, the landowners would

42. In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 811 F. Supp. 1071, 1077 (E.D. Pa. 1992), rev'd, 35
F.3d 717 (3d Cir. 1994).
43. Id. at 1074.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1075 (internal citation omitted).
46. 424 A.2d 902, 912 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981) (affirming trial court's decision to award
damages for diminution in value based on permanent change in drainage field on adjoining
landowner's property).
47. In re PaoliR.&. Yard, 811 F. Supp. at 1076.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1076-77.
50. Id. at 1077.
51. In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 798 (3d Cir. 1994).
52. Id. at 797 (citing Wade v. S.J. Groves & Sons Co., 424 A.2d 902, 911-12 (Pa. Super.

Ct. 1981)).
53. Id. at 796 ("[T]he EPA's own normal practice of cleaning up property to the point
where the risk is 1 in 1,000,000 creates a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a cancer
risk of 1 in 100,000 constitutes permanent damage ....).
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experience an ongoing threat of future injury. In criticizing the traditional rule,
the court stated:
This approach is normally consistent with the view that, when
physical damage is temporary, only repair costs are
recoverable, because in a perfectly functioning market, fully
repaired property will return to its former value. Thus, an
award of repair costs will be fully compensatory.... Hence,
normally, it is only when property cannot be repaired that
courts must award damages for diminution in value in order
to fully compensate plaintiffs. However, the market
sometimes fails and repaircosts arenotfully compensatory.
In such cases... plaintiffs should be compensated for their
remaining loss. Absent such an approach, plaintiffs are
permanently deprived of significant value without any
compensation.'
The court condensed this analysis into a three-prong test to evaluate whether
plaintiffs can recover diminution in property value absent permanent physical
injury to their property. The court determined that plaintiffs may recover
diminution in value "where (1) defendants have caused some (temporary)
physical damage to plaintiffs' property; (2) plaintiffs demonstrate that repair of
this damage will not restore the value of the property to its prior level; and (3)
plaintiffs show that there is some ongoing risk to their land." 5 The three-prong
test addressed the concerns of defendants' amicus, the American Insurance
Association, which argued the following:
[A]llowing a tort for diminution in value would allow
thousands ofinsubstantial and peripheral claims, would often
grant recoveries for routine fluctuations in market prices thus
generating windfalls, and would increase insurance costs,
reduce the availability of insurance, and reduce the
availability of funds to compensate those who were actually
injured.56
The court responded by stating that the newly articulated rule would limit
claims by allowing recovery only when some physical harm to the owner's
land has occurred." It went on to explain that the requirement ofphysical harm
would preclude recovery in "cases such as the establishment of a group home

54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 797-98 (citing Wade, 424 A.2d at 911-12) (emphasis added).
Id. at 798.
Id. at 798 n.64.
In re PaoliR.R. Yard, 35 F.3d at 798.
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for the disabled." 8 The court also rejected the floodgate argument noting that
"[a]ny risk of an avalanche of litigation... will be prevented by the need of
plaintiffs to establish causation and to prove that the stigma associated with
their land will remain in place after any physical damage . . . has been
repaired." s9 With this new damage formulation, the appellate court reversed the
district court's grant of summary judgment for the defendants on the stigma
damage claims.60
The Paoliformulation addresses the concerns mentioned by the court in
6 The Paolicourt fashioned a rule by synthesizing the
Santa Fe Partnership.
traditional awards forpermanent and temporary injury. In the case oftemporary
injury, the landowner must prove that two elements of permanent damage
exist.'2 The landowner must prove both that remediation will not restore the
property to its prior value and that some ongoing risk to the property exists. 34
The last requirement prevents recovery for misguided public perceptions. 6
That is, the court will award stigma damages only when the stigma is warranted
by an ongoing threat.
Paoli'sthree-pronged rule nicely addresses the contrasting goals of full
compensation and reasonable certainty of damages. Furthermore, the rule is
more efficient than the traditional rule, which requires that landowners
sufferingtemporary injury must bring successive suits for damages.65 ThePaoli
approach also conforms to the measure of damages expounded by the
Restatement (Second) of Torts."
III. SOUTH CAROLINA: ADHERING TO TRADITION
A.

The Court'sEarly Treatment of Stigma Damage Claims

58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 798. On remand to the district court, thejury returned a verdict for the defendants
on all claims. In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCP Litig., 113 F.3d 444,447 (3d Cir. 1997). The plaintiffs
appealed contending that the district court improperly instructed the jurors regarding the stigma
damage claims. Id. at 462. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the district judge erred in
instructing the jurors that they must find "actual damage" to plaintiffs' property before the court
could award stigma damages. Id. Plaintiffs argued that "actual damages" meant permanent
damages. Id. at 462-63. The appellate court affirmed the district court, holding that the jury
instructions were proper, and that "after two weeks of trial, the jury remained unconvinced of
the most basic of plaintiffs' claims." Id. at 462-64.
61. 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 214,220 (CLApp. 1996).
62. In re PaoliR.R. Yard, 35 F.3d at 798.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 798 n.64.
65. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
66. RESTATEMENT(SEcoND)OFTORTS § 929 cmt. a (1979) ("In some cases the measure of
recovery may include an amount for depreciation in market value although there has been no
substantial physical harm . ").

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

9

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 52, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 14
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52: 409

Stigma damages have received only limited attention from the South
Carolina courts. However, the few South Carolina stigma damage cases
involving real property follow the traditional approach, awarding diminution
in value only when there is permanent physical injury to the property. 67
Interestingly, the South Carolina courts first dealt with stigma damages in cases
involving automobile damage.68 The South Carolina courts were much more
willing to award damages for the diminution in value of a wrecked car than for
injured real property.
In Coleman v. Levkofj6 the South Carolina Supreme Court was faced with
determining the proper amount of damages to award the plaintiff, whose car
was damaged due to the defendant's negligence. After stating the traditional
measure ofdamages, the court held that if the repairs do not restore the market
value of the property before the injury then the proper amount of damages
includes "the difference in the market value of the property immediately before
the injury and its market value immediately thereafter, in its condition ofpartial
restoration, together with the reasonable cost of the repairs made and the value
of the use of which the owner was deprived . . *.
." Thus, the court
acknowledged in its formulation of the proper measure of damages that a car
loses value after an accident even after the car has been repaired.
In Newman v. Brown7' the court faced another automobile collision case
in which stigma damage was the main issue. The automobile owner's appraiser
testified about the stigma that attaches to an automobile once it has been in an
accident:
'A wrecked car is always a wrecked car, regardless of where
you carry it or try to trade it in, or anything else, it's a
wrecked car.' He further said that he did not want a wrecked
car of any kind and if it were his he would trade it [in]
unrepaired, as it was worth only the salvage value.72
The court cited Coleman v. Levkoff3 as a "well considered case upon the
measure of damages to an automobile" and held that the proper measure of

67. See Yadkin Brick Co. v. Materials Recovery Co., 339 S.C. 640, 647, 529 S.E.2d 764,
768 (Ct. App. 2000) (rejecting claim for diminution in value because of plaintiff's failure to
prove permanent injury to property).
68. See Coleman v. Levkoff, 128 S.C. 487, 491, 122 S.E. 875, 876 (1924) (acknowledging
that repairs may not restore a car to its pre-accident value); Newman v. Brown, 228 S.C. 472,
477, 90 S.E.2d 649, 652 (1955) (allowing for recovery of repair costs plus any remaining
diminution in value); Campbell v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 234 S.C. 572, 577, 109 S.E.2d 572, 577
(1959) (holding that where repairs do not fully restore car to its pre-accident value, the owner
is entitled to recover the diminution in value).
69. 128 S.C. 487, 122 S.E. 875 (1924).
70. Id. at491, 122 S.E. at 876.
71. 228 S.C. 472, 90 S.E.2d 649 (1955).
72. Id. at 475, 90 S.E.2d at 650.
73. 128 S.C. 487, 122 S.E. 875 (1924).
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damages was the cost of repairs plus any remaining diminution in value. 4 The
court noted that .'[a] new car may be badly damaged and be repaired so as to
put it in a sound or good state, and yet be worth much less than before the
collision."'"5
Similarly, in Campbell v. CalvertFireInsuranceCo.,7 6 a case involving a
collision policy, the court noted that "'repair or replacement of broken or
damagedparts"' does not necessarily restore a car to its former condition unless
the value of the car after repair is not diminished. 7
B. The CourtAddresses Stigma Damage with Respect to Real Property
In Gray v. Southern Facilities,Inc. 78 the South Carolina Supreme Court
finally addressed, in a limited way, stigma damages with respect to real
property. In Gray a property owner brought suit against petroleum plant
operators for pumping gasoline into a creek adjacent to the landowner's
property.7 The creek erupted into fire, but did not cause physical damage to the
landowner's property." However, a real estate appraiser testified that the
property value had diminished ten percent as a result ofthe fire.81 The appraiser
gave the following testimony:
"Q. And you believe the property has been damaged because
of the fire, is that right?["]
"A. [I]t does not have any physical damage, actual physical
damage to the property but we are speaking of the
damage to the resale value to the piece of property.["]
"Q. Now, if there were no way for petroleum products to get
into this stream so there could be another fire there would
be no damage would there?["]
"A. I can't say that for this particular reason: you may abate
the possibility of petroleum products going into the
stream, but it is another thing to convince the public that
this has been done.["]

74. Newman, 228 S.C. at 476-77, 90 S.E.2d at 651-52.
75. Id. (quoting Littlejohn v. Elionsky, 36 A.2d 52, 53 (Conn. 1944)); see also Adams v.
Orr, 260 S.C. 92, 99, 194 S.E.2d 232, 235 (1973) (holding that "the plaintiff was entitled to
recover for loss of use of the vehicle and for depreciation, which every wrecked vehicle
experiences").
76. 234 S.C. 583, 109 S.E.2d 572 (1959).
77. Id. at 591, 109 S.E.2d at 576 (quoting Rossier v. Union Auto Ins. Co., 291 P. 498, 500
(1930).
78. 256 S.C. 558, 183 S.E.2d 438 (1971).
79. Id. at 561, 183 S.E.2d at 439.
80. Id. at 561-62, 183 S.E.2d at 439.
81. Id. at 564, 183 S.E.2d at440.
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"Q. This is really a damage to the reputation of the property,
wouldn't you say... ?["I
"A. Yes, to a degree, that's correct.["]

"Q.If you went out there today there would be absolutely no
evidence that there had ever been a fire would there?["]
"A. No sir.["]
"Q. So what you are talking about is damage that people have
in their minds because of a history of something that has
happened?["]
"A. Yes, sir.["]
"Q. And damage through fear that this might happen
again?["]

"A. That's about it, yes, sir." 2
The court noted the general rule that "'injury to the reputation
of... property has been held not to be a proper element of damages."'8 3 The
court commented that only a few courts in other jurisdictions had considered
the issue, but that no general rule had been developed." The court declined to
establish a rule of its own because "[t]he evidence as to the diminution of
market value is, in our view, speculative, not only as to the amount but
speculative as to the portion thereof proximately and directly resulting
from.., the respondents." 5 The court decided that the landowner failed to
prove proximate cause because other petroleum plants were located in the same
area, and because these plants had also occasionally leaked gasoline into the
creek. 86 Because the plaintiff failed to prove causation, the court declined to
address the stigma damage issue."
In Yadkin Brick Co. v. MaterialsRecovery Co."8 the South Carolina Court
of Appeals took a more definitive stance in addressing stigma damages.8 9 In
Yadkin the owner of a brickyard sued a chemical company that shipped
hazardous materials to the brickyard." The brickyard had received permission
from North Carolina environmental authorities allowing the brickyard "to
incorporate defined proportions ofpetroleum-contaminated soils into its brickmaking process."9' 1 However, the sludge that the chemical company shipped to

82. Id. at 564-65, 183 S.E.2d at 440-41.
83. Id. at 569, 183 S.E.2d at 443 (quoting 22 AM. JUR. 2DDamages § 136) (omission in
original).
84. Gray, 256 S.C. at 569-70, 183 S.E.2d at 443.
85. Id. at571, 183 S.E.2d at 444.
86. Id. at 570, 183 S.E.2d at 444.
87. Id.
88. 339 S.C. 640,529 S.E.2d 764 (Ct. App. 2000).
89. Id. at 646-48, 529 S.E.2d at 767-68.
90. Id. at 644, 529 S.E.2d at 766.
91. Id.
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the brickyard was contaminated with Dowtherm.' The brickyard did not have
authorization to process or store Dowtherm. 3 The brickyard sued for damages
arguing that the presence of Dowtherm diminished the value of the brickyard
property." At the time of trial the brickyard had been sold to a third party. s
The former brickyard owners offered the reduced selling price as evidence of
the diminution in value."
However, the South Carolina Court of Appeals held that this evidence did
not prove that the buyer "subtracted a certain sum because ofthe Dowtherm on
the property."' In affirming the trial court's directed verdict for the chemical
company, the South Carolina Court of Appeals relied heavily on Gray and
adhered to the traditional rule ofdamages. 9 Quoting Gray,the court explained
the general rule on damages in South Carolina:
[I]n case of an injury of a permanent nature to real
property... the proper measure of damages is the diminution
of the market value by reason of th[e] injury, or in other
words, the difference between the value of the land before the
injury and its value after the injury. Where the
pollution... results in a temporary or nonpermanent injury
to real property, the injured landowner can recover the
depreciation in the rental or usable value of the property
caused by the pollution.
The appellate court held that the brickyard failed to establish a permanent
injury to the property, and thus diminution in value was not the proper measure
of damages: "There was no evidence presented to establish that damage to the
property would continue to exist once the cleanup was accomplished."" 0
In response, the former brickyard owners argued a "novel theory of
permanency. 10
' The former owners contended that "since the property was
sold during the pendency of the action and.., the sales price was depressed
due to the presence of the Dowtherm-contaminated soil, the damage to [the
plaintiff] is therefore permanent" because the former owners sold theirproperty
at a reduced price." The appellate court rejected this argument holding that the

92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Yadkin, 339 S.C. at 644, 529 S.E.2d at 766.
95. Id. at 646-47, 529 S.E.2d at 767.
96. Id. at 646, 529 S.E.2d at 767.
97. Id. at 647, 529 S.E.2d at 767.
98. Id. at 645-46, 529 S.E.2d at 767.
99. Id. (quoting Gray v. S. Facilities, Inc., 256 S.C. 558,569, 183 S.E.2d 438,443 (1971)
(alterations in original)).
100. Yadkin, 339 S.C. at 647,529 S.E.2d at 768.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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brickyard
"must prove that the damage is permanent to the property," not to the
10 3
plaintiff
Thus, the South Carolina Court ofAppeals followed the same traditional,
inflexible rule that the Santa Fe Partnershipcourt followed. However, it is
important to remember that in Gray the South Carolina Supreme Court
refrained from deciding the stigma damage issue because the plaintifffailed to
prove causation. However, in Yadkin the South Carolina Court of Appeals,
rejecting the stigma damage claim, relied on Gray despite the Gray court's
decision not to address the issue.
IV. THE FUTURE OF STIGMA DAMAGES INSOUTH CAROLINA
A. Paoli as a Model
As stigma damage claims continue to rise, South Carolina courts will need
to readdress and supplement the incomplete analyses offered by the Gray and
Yadkin courts. In doing so, the courts should look to Paoli for guidance to
formulate a rule that will address the opposing goals of full recovery and
reasonable certainty.
Apart from the South Carolina automobile-wreck cases, South Carolina
courts have adhered to the traditional measure of damages for real property,
awarding diminution in value only when there is permanent physical injury.' °
This traditional measure ensures that the diminution in value is causally related
to the physical injury. Furthermore, the court faces less risk of
overcompensating the plaintiff, and the diminution in value is not as
speculative when there is permanent damage to the property. The court is not
faced with the problem of awarding damages based on misplaced public
perceptions.
The traditional rule certainly does have some benefits. However, the Paoli
rule manages to preserve these benefits while acknowledging the reality that
public perception does influence property value. By requiring actual physical
injury to the land, the Paolitest ensures that any stigma damage is causally
related to the injury caused by the defendant. The requirement that the plaintiff
prove that remediation will not restore the value of the property to its prior
level protects against overcompensating the plaintiff. Finally, the requirement
that the plaintiff'prove that there is some ongoing risk to the property protects
against awarding damages based on the public's unfounded fears and
perceptions about the property. If the plaintiff can prove that there will be a
continuing risk, the negative public perception is likely to remain consistent
over time. The plaintiff will not recover for the public's fear that there will be

103. Id. at 647-48, 529 S.E.2d at 768.
104. See id. at 645-46, 529 S.E.2d at 767.
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another injury to the property, unless there actually is a proven risk of further
injury to the property.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 929 addresses recovery for harm to
land from past invasions.' Consider comment a of § 929:
In some cases the measure of recovery may include an
amountfor depreciationin market value although there has
been no substantialphysical harm, as when a test well is
bored by a trespasser and proved to be dry, and as a result the
land loses its value as an oil prospect. In this case the owner
may be entitled to substantial damages on the ground that
although he is not entitled to represent it as oil-bearing land
after discovering that it is not, or to insist on the silence of
one who had acquired information of the truth without
committing a trespass, he is entitled to have the aleatory
character of his land protected against trespasses.106
The foregoing example is analogous to property damage caused by remediable
contamination. The property owner will have to disclose to all future
purchasers that the property was once contaminated. 7 Thus, the price of the
owner's property will be reduced by the fears of prospective buyers that the
property is still contaminated. The Second Restatement example involves a
trespasser who reveals an inherent characteristic in the land, the knowledge of
which makes the land less valuable-namely, the absence of oil on the land.
The Second Restatement allows recovery because this knowledge is obtained
by unlawful means.
An even stronger case for stigma damage recovery exists when the
nuisance or trespass occurs in the form of contamination. Not only is the
nuisance or trespass unlawful in itself, but, in the form of contamination, the
nuisance or trespass causes physical injury to the land. This type of injury is
more severe than the example offered by the Restatement (Second)of Torts. In
the Second Restatement example, the trespass did not cause physical injury to
the land. Rather, the trespass merely revealed the fact that the land was not
suitable for drilling oil, the knowledge of which decreased the value of the
land.' Presumably, either the current owner or a subsequent owner would
eventually learn on her own that the land was not suitable for drilling oil.

105. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTS § 929 (1979).
106. Id. § 929 cmt. a (emphasis added).
107. See Timothy J. Muldowney & Kendall W. Harrison, Stigma Damages: Property
Damage and the Fear of Risk, 62 DEF. CoUNs. J. 525, 529 (1995) (noting that the advent of
residential real estate disclosure laws make "the climate for stigma damages claims very
favorable").
108. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 929 cmt. a (1979).
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Contamination causes a more severe injury because not only is the
contamination itself a trespass or nuisance, but additionally, the contamination
actually injures the land. The SecondRestatement anticipated the reality that
the Paolicourt acknowledged in its formulation of stigma damages: that real
property is subject to stigma and that this has an appreciable effect on the
property's value. 09
B. Policy Considerations
Stigma damage reflects the reality that injury to real property is not
necessarily confined by boundary lines, nor does the injury necessarily
disappear when the source of the harm is remediated. Stigma damage
represents the market's perception of the decrease in property value caused by
the injury to the property. This perception is limited by the amount of reliable
information available to the public regarding the property in question. "'When
more information is available to the public about the property's condition, the
stigma will more accurately represent the actual decrease in value caused by the
injury. When less information is available to the public, the stigma will more
likely be based on irrational fears.
This asymmetry of information poses a problem for courts, which must
address claims for stigma damage based on both accurate information and
irrational fears. In formulating a rule to address stigma damage claims, the
courts should consider addressing the issue from a public policy standpoint. It
is an economic reality that real property may experience a diminution in value
despite remediation. In addressing stigma damage claims, the courts must
decide whether to protect the tortfeasor from liability for damages based on
public perceptions, or whether to compensate the innocent landowner for his
property's diminution in value. That is, should the plaintiff or the defendant
bear the liability for the discrepancy between what the property is actually
worth and the value the market has attributed to the property?".
As a matter of public policy, the courts should consider that awarding
stigma damages can serve as an economic deterrent to property-damaging
tortfeasors." 2 If property-damaging tortfeasors are held liable for postremediation stigma damages, they will be forced to acknowledge the reality

109. See id.; In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 798 (3d Cir. 1994).
110. See Phillip S. Mitchell, EstimatingEconomic Damagesto Real PropertyDue to Loss
ofMarketability,Rentability,andStigma,68 APPRAISALJ. 162, 163 (2000) (citing "[u]ncertainty

due to the lack of generally available, accurate market information concerning the property's
current status" as a cause of diminished marketability).
111. InAdkins v. Thomas Solvent Co., 487 N.W.2d 715,737 (Mich. 1992), a contamination
case, the dissent addressed this very question. Justice Levin, dissenting from the majority's
denial ofplaintiffs' stigma damage claim, stated that "[p]rotecting polluters of the water supply
againstthe consequences oftheir conductis not... an interest deserving ofjudicial indulgence."
112. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 (1979) (stating that one function of
damages in tort is to "deter wrongful conduct.").
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that remediation does not always restore property values to their pre-injury
value. In the contamination context, stigma damage awards can act as an
economic deterrent that can supplement statutory regulation."'
V. CONCLUSION

Currently, the South Carolina courts have only addressed stigma damage
in a limited way. In Gray v. Southern Facilities,Inc. the South Carolina
Supreme Court declined to address the stigma damages issue because the
plaintiffs failed to prove causation. 14 However, in Yadkin Brick Co. v.
MaterialsRecovery Co. the South Carolina Court of Appeals determined that
diminution in value, and thus stigma damage, is not an element of recovery in
the absence of permanent damage to real property." 5 The appellate court cited
Gray despite the fact that the Gray court chose not to address the stigma
damage issue."" Therefore the issue of stigma damages is still unresolved in
South Carolina.
Although the South Carolina Supreme Court has not yet addressed the
issue of stigma damage, the issue is likely to appear before the court soon. The
frequency with which plaintiffs are seeking stigma damages in suits for injury
to real property is increasing. These suits do not involve only nuisance and
trespass; they also include suits for breach of pest control contracts, defective
construction, deceptive trade practices, and CERCLA. Stigma damage has also
been an issue in the increasingly litigious area of synthetic stucco." 7
The stigma damage rule developed by the Paolicourt is broad enough to
cover the different types of litigation under which stigma.damages arise. Yet,
the Paoli rule is refined enough to manage the opposing goals of full
compensation and reasonable certainty. While not discussed by the Paolicourt,
the South Carolina Supreme Court may consider that as a matter of public
policy, awarding stigma damages can also serve as an economic deterrent that

113. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Tort Law in the Regulatory State, in TORTLAW AND THE
PUBLICINTEREST 80,86 (Peter H. Schuck ed., 1991) ("Ideally, tort law and regulatory standards

work together to further deterrence and compensation goals."). Rose-Ackerman notes three
situations in which tort law and statutory regulations can be complementary:
(1) when tort doctrines are stopgaps that apply absent more stringent
statutes; (2) when regulatory standards are intended as minima that more
stringent tort doctrines can supplement; and (3) when a regulatory standard
is set at the socially optimal level and tort doctrine imposes either strict
liability or a standard of care lower than that required by the agency.
Id.
114. 256 S.C. 558, 570, 183 S.E.2d 438,443-44 (1971).
115. 339 S.C. 640,645-48,529 S.E.2d 764,767-68 (Ct. App. 2000).
116. Id. at 647-48, 529 S.E.2d at 768.
117. See In re Stucco Litig., 175 F.R.D. 210, 219 (E.D.N.C. 1997) (denying class
certification because plaintiffs asserted stigma damage when only some plaintiffs suffered
physical damage to property and because some plaintiffs lived in a region where synthetic stucco
carries no stigma).

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

17

426

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 52, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 14
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
[Vol. 52:409

will protect landowners from property-damaging tortfeasors. The South
Carolina Supreme Court should consider Paolias the court seeks to formulate
a rule on stigma damage that will fairly serve both the defendants and the
plaintiffs of South Carolina.
JenniferL. Young
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